Introduction
The importance of the retail market for structured financial products (SFPs) has grown immensely over recent decades. Banks and other financial institutions are issuing various types of financial instruments for individual investors. While the US market is highly individualized and thus opaque, markets in Europe are more standardized and transparent.
In terms of outstanding instruments, the German market is the largest market worldwide, with more than 800,000 single products.
The issuance of SFPs goes hand in hand with the publication of term sheets, sales brochures, and other prospectuses. These documents fulfill the purpose of both customer information and marketing. The preparation of certain documents is regulated by law.
In the US, Title 17 Chapter II Part 230 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Securities
Act from 1933) determines content and publication requirements for prospectuses. In Germany, besides providing a detailed prospectus, according to Section 31 of the Securities Trading Act, issuers are required to provide a standardized Key Investor Information Document of not more than 3 pages.
The regulatory intention is the creation of transparency and information for investors.
Up to a certain degree, this intention is congruent with the goal of issuers to sell their products. However, to achieve this goal, issuers are not aiming at providing a maximum of objective information, but at biasing the information to make their products look better than they actually are.
As a major instrument, issuers use scenarios for both providing and biasing information.
As SFPs are usually linked to the development of one or more underlying securities (usually stock indices or single stocks), the structure of the product can be explained by choosing hypothetical scenarios for the underlying development and demonstrating the product behavior and payoff contingent on these hypothetical developments. Each scenario provides objective information, but the selection of scenarios leaves the degree of freedom to overweight favorable scenarios with positive returns and underweight scenarios with negative returns.
Recent literature has demonstrated that prospectuses of SFPs indeed exhibit such a tendency towards biased information. Bernard et al. (2011) analyze prospectuses of 29 locallycapped products. 1 They show that the prospectuses often contain unreasonably optimistic hypothetical scenarios and conjecture that too optimistic scenarios may contribute to the popularity of these products. Olazábal and Marmorstein (2010) also consider example prospectuses of locally-capped products and come to similar results. Given their analysis, they make a strong call for a stricter regulation of prospectuses for structured retail products on the lines of Federal guidelines on how to create scenarios.
However, evidence on how issuers actually choose scenarios is limited. In the first part of this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive empirical study of scenarios in prospectuses of SFPs. We analyze all prospectuses filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within May and June 2012, incorporating more than 1,200 products. Furthermore, we analyze all Key Investor Information Documents of major issuers of three popular product types on the German market, incorporating more than 18,000 products. As a simple measure, we look at the arithmetic mean of product returns within the scenarios.
The results are astonishing. Contrary to our expectations, the average scenario return is negatively biased. Both on the US market and the German market, the average product 1 These products basically aggregate short-term (e.g., quarterly) performances of an underlying, where each short-term performance is subject to a cap.
return within all analyzed prospectuses is highly negative (−5% and −15%, respectively).
This observation holds throughout almost all issuers-with only three exceptions, all of the 17 issuers provide scenarios with negative average returns.
Given the intuition that issuers should use positively biased scenarios for marketing purposes, these results demand an explanation. A possible reason could be caution in terms of regulatory requirements. Although no explicit rules for the selection of scenarios exist, both US and German law says that information in the documents must not be misleading.
So issuers could fear legal consequences and compensation payments if courts interpret positively biased information as misleading and thus illegal.
To shed further light on issuers' motivations for being so conservative with their scenario selection, we analyze in the second part of the paper the reception of scenarios by potential investors. In an experimental study, test persons viewed fictitious prospectuses with differently biased scenarios. Based on an objective product description and these scenarios, they were asked about their judgement of the product in terms of expected return, risk, attractiveness, etc.
The main finding is that a bias in the scenario selection has little impact on investors' perception of the product. So investors are not as prone to manipulation efforts by biased scenarios as assumed. In this light, issuers selecting conservative scenarios becomes reasonable: The benefits derived from positive bias in terms of marketing are small. There are however potential negative effects in terms of legal risk. Issuers thus choose scenarios that fulfill explicit and implicit legal requirements and have little incentive to test the legal twilight zone of these requirements, as the customer-attracting benefits do not outweigh the potential risks.
Relation to the Literature
The paper is related to the growing body of literature on SFPs for individual investors.
Early research mainly focuses on the prices of SFPs with respect to their theoretical fair values. Several empirical studies find an average overpricing, that is, issuers charge prices a few percent above the theoretical fair product value. These studies include, for example, Burth et al. (2001) on the Swiss market, Wilkens et al. (2003) on the German market, or Benet et al. (2006) on the US market.
With markets developing and products becoming more standardized, issuer margins decrease. Baule (2011) reports an average overpricing of as little as 0.4% for the subsegment of discount certificates on the DAX. He argues that on the one hand, standardization and economies of scale reduce issuer costs, and that on the other, increased competition and transparency forces issuers to price more aggressively. Supporting this argumentation, Baule and Blonski (2012) find that individual investors are even able to exploit small price differences between similar products. However, this argumentation only holds for highly standardized products, where the investor has the choice of buying virtually the same SFP from different competing issuers. Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) show that margins increase with the complexity of the product. Henderson and Pearson (2011) analyze 64 offering prices of structured equity products on the US retail market and find an average overpricing of almost 8% above the fair product value.
A second strand of literature deals with the question of why investors buy such products, despite the unfavorable conditions they face. Considering only rational arguments, the large demand for SFPs can hardly be explained. Hens and Rieger (2011) show that, compared to standard investments in the underlying security and the risk-free instrument, a utility gain from SFPs either does not exist at all or is so small that it is offset by issuer margins (even for standardized products with the mentioned low margins). Thus, only irrational or behavioral arguments, like loss aversion or the mis-estimation of unfavorable outcomes resulting from high product complexity, can explain the popularity of SFPs. This is in line with Breuer and Perst (2007) , who show that investors overweight small probabilities. In a similar context, Hoffmann and Broekhuizen (2010) Besides rational strategies like diversification, gambling plays an important role. In an experimental approach with 190 participants, Rieger and Hens (2012) find evidence that the majority of investors would prefer capital guaranteed products, for example for saving motives. Since this cannot be observed in reality, they argue that financial advisors do not provide unbiased counseling but instead boost demand for SFPs. Analyzing the investment decisions of more than 50 undergraduate students, Rieger (2012) explains the demand for popular SFPs (especially bonus certificates) with a tremendous under-estimation of the probability of downside risks. This finding is supported by evidence from Henderson and Pearson (2011) and could, in combination with the evidence for overpricing, call for greater regulation of SFPs to protect individual investors. Such an argumentation is supported by findings that demand for SFPs depends negatively on investor's financial literacy (Chang et al., 2010 ) and higher product complexity lowers investor's return (Entrop et al., 2012) .
Besides legal sales restrictions on both markets, regulation mainly draws on information requirements. In the US, SFPs are treated as securities defined in Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act from 1933. US issuers are required to provide information for all newly issued products with the SEC. According to Rule 405, legislation differentiates between well-known (seasoned) and unseasoned issuers. At this juncture, well-known seasoned issuers are able to shelf-register multiple products autonomously by filing one single form (Rule 424(b)(2)), which simplifies the regulatory procedure.
The European Market is regulated by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). It was introduced to harmonize European regulation and to offer investors a higher level of protection. According to Section 2, Article 19, issuers are required to act honestly, fairly and professionally for the best interest of their clients. For this purpose, issuers must provide fair, not misleading, and appropriate information in a comprehensible form concerning, for example, the risks associated with a certain investment. In addition to this European directive, German legislation requires issuers to recap the main product facts in a Key Investor Information Document of no more than 3 pages (Section 31(3)(a) of the Securities Trading Act). Neither US nor German issuers are required by law to publish scenarios in their information documents. Nevertheless, scenarios displaying potential future returns of an SFP based on the development of the underlying have become a common part of prospectuses.
According to Breaban et al. (2012) , scenarios could influence the investment decision process. In an experimental approach with about 500 undergraduate students, they show that information available to investors (and particularly the order in which this information is presented) affects investor behavior. Bernard et al. (2011) Up till now, neither the actual extent to which issuers provide biased information nor the reception of such information by potential investors have been analyzed in detail. This gap is filled by this paper.
In Section 3 ("Persuasion") we address the actual practice of biasing information: Do issuers indeed try to persuade investors to buy their product by means of biased scenarios?
The section presents an extensive market study of scenarios within prospectuses to answer this question. While Bernard et al. (2011) as well as Olazábal and Marmorstein (2010) only analyze a small number of term sheets, we provide the first extensive analysis of the US and German markets.
In Section 4 ("Persuasibility") we address the reception of information: Are investors indeed prone to possible persuasion by means of biased scenarios? The section presents an experimental study to answer this second question. Breaban et al. (2012) consecutively display 60 single scenarios to their participants and ask for their resulting investment decision. This procedure, however, is unrealistic with respect to real-world prospectuses in which investors are provided a table containing a reasonable number of scenarios. In our survey we are close to real-world settings, providing term sheets with scenarios similar to actual prospectuses.
Persuasion
The data set we analyze contains information documents published by different banks in the US and in Germany. The US part of the data consists of prospectuses for all SFPs issued during May and June 2012. This data was manually extracted from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR) of the SEC. We considered Form 424B2 which well-known seasoned companies are required to file in accordance with Rule 424(b)(2). During the two-month period, more than 2,500 products were issued of which 1,294 contain tabular scenarios which are suited to our analysis.
As the German market for SFPs is more standardized than the US market, we choose to concentrate on two of the most popular products to get a homogenous data set that allows for direct comparison across several issuers. Regulation in Germany not only requires information brochures to fulfill certain criteria but also to be made available to the investor upon investment, which most banks solve by offering these brochures for download on their websites. We downloaded all available Key Investor Information Documents of discount certificates and bonus certificates from the nine largest issuers outstanding in March 2012, resulting in a total data set of 18,666 prospectuses.
Discount certificates enable investors to buy an underlying at a discount to the current market value. As a compensation for the discount, possible gains are capped at a certain level, that is, the payoff at maturity is either the terminal underlying value or the cap, whatever is smaller. Bonus certificates feature a conditional capital protection. As long as the underlying does not fall below a certain threshold (barrier) during the certificate's lifetime, the payoff is at least as high as the bonus level (usually equal to the issue price). Otherwise, the payoff equals the underlying price at maturity. A subtype of bonus certificates additionally features a cap similar to discount certificates.
The focus of our investigation lies on the scenarios in these documents. We are particularly interested in the "suggested return" implied by these scenarios, defined as the arithmetic mean of product returns of all scenarios within one document. Additionally, considering the risk perspective, we look at the standard deviation of product returns across all scenarios of a single prospectus as the "suggested risk". Table 1 and 2 summarize descriptive statistics of the respective market.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here. For the US market, the suggested return is negative on average with a mean of −5%.
While there are some fluctuations across the issuers, 10 out of 13 issuers (the exceptions being Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo) suggest a negative return for their products on average.
These surprising results are qualified by the existence of total loss scenarios. A considerable number of prospectuses contain such default scenarios with a product return of −100% that downward-bias the arithmetic mean. As a second measure, we therefore consider the median of scenario product returns within a document. The average median over all prospectuses amounts to +2%. This figure can be seen as a reasonable, yet conservative, value of actually expected returns. The largest average medians are found for Bank of America (+15%) and Morgan Stanley (+8%).
Yet contrary to expectations, there is no broad upward-bias of scenario returns in prospectuses issued by US banks. With a few exceptions, most banks provide reasonable or even slightly downward-biased scenarios to demonstrate the behavior of their products.
For the German market, the negative bias is even more pronounced. All 9 issuers suggest a negative return of their products on average, with the overall mean being as low as −15%.
Fluctuations across issuers range from −26% (DZ Bank) to −3% (HSBC).
Again, these results are partially driven by a skewed selection of scenarios, in particular by the existence of total loss scenarios. Thus median values are less negative with an overall average of 0%. The range across issuers covers −6% to +6%. So also for the German market, scenarios are reasonably selected, being even a bit more conservative than for the US markets. In particular, there is no single issuer deviating from this policy.
According to the standardization and selection of documents, we can carry out a more detailed analysis for the German documents to identify drivers of the suggested returns.
We regress the average scenario return per product on the product characteristics, namely the time to maturity, the cap in the case of discount certificates, the barrier and bonus level and an indicator variable for a cap in the case of bonus certificates, furthermore the number of scenarios in the document and a series of issuer dummies.
Insert Table 3 about here.
The results are presented in Table 3 . As expected, an increase of the remaining time to maturity increases suggested returns by about 4.5% per year for bonus certificates and 2.8% per year for discount certificates. For discount certificates, the cap level lowers suggested returns by 0.7% per 1,000 index points, which is in line with the actual expected return. For bonus certificates, the bonus level has little impact (+0.5% per 1,000 index points), whereas the barrier level increases the suggested return by 5.0% per 1,000 points. This is interesting as an increase of the barrier leads to a reduced return and one would, at first sight, expect a negative impact. However, apparently, this effect is offset by higher selling prices of products with lower barriers. Again in line with actual returns, capped bonus certificates suggest 3.2% lower returns than bonus certificates without a cap.
As to the issuers, our statistical findings for the issuer dummies are fairly consistent with our descriptive results in Table 2 . HSBC suggests relatively high returns, and DZ Bank, being the reference value in the regressions, suggests relatively low returns. Therefore, issuers with a higher overpricing have a higher coefficient and vice versa.
Besides suggested returns, it is interesting to take a look at the suggested risk. For the US market however, a closer appraisal is difficult, as the variety of products is large and the actual risk of the certificates takes very different shapes. For the German market, a comparison of issuers is easier due to the selection of standardized products. While for the majority of issuers, the average standard deviation of scenario returns is between 30% and 50%, this value is only 13% to 14% for two issuers (Citigroup and HSBC). This difference mainly depends on the existence of a total loss scenario. Citigroup and HSBC (and also Deutsche Bank) have no total loss scenarios in their documents, while the other issuers do (for almost all of their products).
Summing up, we find that suggested returns are not upward-biased on both markets. Within this study, each participant was given a one-page key information document of one fictitious structured product with a description of its functionality. As with actual issuer prospectuses, the documents contained scenarios to illustrate the behavior of the product with respect to the development of the underlying. 2 The scenarios varied in terms of "suggested return" and "suggested risk": About a third of our documents were equipped with upward-biased scenarios, a third with unbiased scenarios, and another third with downward-biased scenarios. Positive investor returns were highlighted in green and negative returns in red. With respect to suggested risk, half of the documents were equipped with scenarios covering a high fluctuation range of possible future outcomes, the other half with a small range. Additionally, half of our scenarios were in ascending order, the other half in descending.
We utilized three different kinds of SFPs, namely discount certificates, bonus certificates, and express certificates. These products differ in the complexity of the payoff structure in ascending order. The functionality of discount and bonus certificates has already been sketched in Section 3. With Express certificates, the price of the underlying is observed at a fixed number of observation days (usually once a year or once a quarter). If it is at or above a specified threshold level, the certificate is redeemed prematurely with an interest rate above the risk-free rate. If the price of the underlying trades below the threshold level, the certificate continues to run to the next observation day. In case the threshold level is never breached at any observation date, the payoff depends on whether the underlying has fallen below a certain safety barrier during the certificate's lifetime: If not, investors receive a repayment of the issue price; if it does, they receive a payment according to the underlying price at maturity (which usually means the incurrence of a loss).
Given the information document, the participants were asked for their estimation of return and risk of the product. For comparison reasons, also estimated return and risk of the underlying was queried. While return was to be estimated as a percentage value, perception of risk was asked on a 6 point Likert-type scale from 1 (very low risk) to 6 (very high risk).
Additionally, also on a 6 point Likert-type scale, we asked for the perceived complexity of the certificate and the comprehensibility of the information document. In addition, we included a comprehension test with three questions concerning the functionality of the specific product. While completing the survey, the participants were restricted from using reference material and from conferring with one another.
The data set comprises survey results from about 300 participants. All participants are students of a large state university. With our survey we cover a broad range of degree programs and investment expertise. After deleting incompletely filled surveys we end up with a total set of 237 evaluated documents.
Results
We expect to find differences in the estimated return and risk for the subgroups of documents with different suggested return and suggested risk. Table 4 shows the results with standard errors in parentheses.
Insert Table 4 about here. Surprisingly, the suggested return, manipulated by a bias in scenario selection, has no significant impact on the perceived return. Likewise, the suggested risk, measured by the range of scenarios, has no significant impact on the perceived risk. We employ an ANOVA and a distribution-free Kruskal-Wallis test to test the null hypothesis that the means (medians) of our groups are all equal. With one exception, all tests are far off from rejecting the respective null hypothesis that means (medians) of perceived return or risk are equal among the groups. The exception is a slightly significant difference in perceived risk for different suggested returns (p-values about 10%). Thus while suggested return has no influence on perceived return nor suggested risk on perceived risk, we have some indications of a cross-influence of suggested return on perceived risk.
To analyze these results in more depth, we run a regression model controlling for a number of potentially influencing variables. Instead of using an ordinary scaled variable (upward bias, no bias, downward bias), we regress the estimated return on the suggested return, measured by the average certificate return within the scenarios, on a metric scale. The basic model structure thus reads
where RET EST i is the return estimated by the participants (as a metric variable), RET SU GG i is the return suggested by the prospectus as described above, and Controls i is a vector of control variables.
Parallel to the return regression, we run a risk regression as follows:
The estimated risk RISK EST i is the participants' risk perception on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 6 (high risk). The suggested risk RISK SU GG i is measured by the standard deviation of certificate returns within the scenarios.
For the control variables, the perceived risk and return of the product could depend on the perceived risk and return of the underlying. However, if the prospectus is able to bias investors' perception of the underlying, the purpose of investor inducement is already fulfilled. Consider for instance an average, unbiased, estimated underlying return and certificate return of 6% and 4%, respectively, and estimated returns of 9% and 7% with upward-biased scenarios. The relative perception of the certificate with respect to the underlying was not influenced, but without doubt the scenarios influenced the investor in this example. We therefore run models with and without controlling for underlying perception.
Furthermore, in the return regression we control for perceived risk and vice versa. Additional variables are dummies for the certificate type (discount, bonus, or express), a dummy for the scenario order (ascending/descending), perceived product complexity and prospectus understandability, and participant information such as gender, age, and selfassessed expertise in investment products.
We test a number of models nested within the global regression model containing all mentioned control variables. Furthermore, to consider potentially different effects for different certificate types, we alter Equations (1) and (2) by replacing the global effect of suggested risk and return by interaction terms with dummies indicating a specific certificate type: Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here.
None of our models shows a significant relationship between the perceived return and the suggested return. In addition to a lack of significance, coefficients are rather small and therefore hardly relevant. For example, with a coefficient of 0.06 (Model 3 in Table 5 ), increasing suggested return by 1% only leads to an increase of 0.06% in perceived return.
The only significant variable influencing the estimate of product returns is the investor's own estimate of underlying return. This is reasonable-investors appraise the certificate relative to the underlying security. The negative results for an influence of suggested return however strengthen the evidence of the ANOVA that investors are hardly influenced by scenario biases.
Regarding perceived risk, things are a little bit more differentiated. To begin with, as with the return and in line with the ANOVA, suggested risk has no significant impact on estimated risk in any of the models. Strengthening the indications of the ANOVA, suggested return however does have a significant impact (at the 5% level) on estimated risk. This means that an upward-bias in scenarios and thus a higher suggested return has no impact on perceived return, but lowers perceived risk.
This interesting result sheds light on how investors define risk: They obviously do not see risk as volatility-that is, the range of possible returns-but as the eventuality of incurring losses, that is, as a kind of a downside risk such as a shortfall probability. An upward-biased scenario selection yields an upward-biased suggested return and an unbiased volatility risk, but also upward-biased downside risk, as with the upward-bias the number of scenarios that create a decrease in loss.
The influence of the investor's own estimate of underlying risk is similar yet smaller than with returns. Thus as with returns, investors appraise certificate risk relative to underlying risk. More pronounced than this relation is however the relation between estimated underlying return and estimated certificate risk: The higher the estimated underlying return, the lower is the perceived certificate risk (significant influence at the 1% level). This finding fits well in the interpretation of risk as a downside risk: With higher underlying returns, a negative product return becomes less likely.
Summing up the results, suggested return has no direct impact on on perceived return nor suggested risk on perceived risk. However suggested return does have an cross-impact on perceived risk. This impact is explained with an interpretation of risk as downside risk.
The size of the effect is not very large: An increase in suggested return of 10% leads to a decrease in perceived risk of 0.2 points on a scale from 1 to 6. So there is a degree of investor persuasibility, this degree is however small.
We ran a battery of robustness checks to confirm the results. These checks refer to variable transformations such as a normalization of returns, and to several subsets, for instance only participants with high or low self-estimated expertise-level, or participants who are willing to make an investment in the certificate, or male and female participants, or subsets separated by certificate type. The results change only slightly, leaving the qualitative findings of the presented analysis untouched.
Conclusion and Outlook
Analyzing more than 20,000 prospectuses of structured financial products, we show that most banks use reasonable or even negatively biased scenarios to illustrate their products.
This finding holds true for both the German US markets. Our results firmly contradict the often heard criticism that banks are inclined to bias returns systematically upward in scenarios in order to incite investors to buy their products. Given these results, a stronger regulation for scenarios in selling brochures appears redundant.
Based on an experimental study, we furthermore find that individual investors are less moved by possibly biased scenarios than might be conjectured. As a whole, suggested returns do not have a significant impact on the perceived return of the product, nor does suggested riskiness in terms of volatility affect perceived riskiness. A closer look at perceived riskiness however reveals that investors see risk as a downside risk. Their perception of downside risk can be slightly influenced by scenarios: Upward-biased scenarios, independent of the volatility, lead to a lower perception of loss probability and thus risk. On the other hand, future research could focus on a regulatory perspective with a number of possible objects of investigation. First of all, it would be highly interesting to figure out how a prospectus should be designed in order to maximize product comprehension while keeping the complexity of the brochure low. As providing scenarios automatically increases the length of the brochure, it remains to be determined if the assumed resulting increase in comprehensibility is worth the cost and whether it does not risk information overload. 3 Döbeli and Vanini (2010) Table 1 . Descriptive statistics of prospectuses on the US market. The columns list the total number of documents with scenarios issued in May and June 2012, the total number of documents that contain a total loss scenario, the percentage of positive scenarios, the average number of scenarios per document, the average suggested return (arithmetic mean of scenario returns), the average median scenario return, the standard deviation of suggested returns, and the average suggested risk (standard deviation of scenario returns). Table 5 . Regression analysis of estimated certificate returns (5 models). RET SU GG is the suggested return measured as the average certificate return within the scenarios. In Model 5, interaction terms with dummies indicating discount certificates, bonus certificates, and express certificates are used. RISK SU GG is the suggested risk measured as the standard deviation of certificate returns within the scenarios, ORDER is the ordering of scenarios (1 for ascending, 0 for descending), U L RET EST is the estimated underlying return (metric scale), U L RISK EST is the estimated underlying risk on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high).
Issuer
For these main variables, standard errors are reported in parentheses. The following variables are controls: DISCOU N T and BON U S are dummies indicating discount and bonus certificates, respectively. COM P LEXIT Y is the perception of document complexity, T AN GIBILIT Y the perception of product understandability, on a scale from 1 to 6, respectively. AGE is the participant's age in years, GEN DER is a dummy which is 1 if the participant is male. EXP ERT ISE is the self-assessed expertise on a scale from 1 to 6, and COM P REHEN SION an objective understanding measured by the number of correctly answered comprehensive questions. For control variables, standard errors are omitted. Significance at the 5% level is denoted by * , at the 1% level by * * , and at the 0.1% level by * * * . Table 6 . Regression analysis of estimated certificate risk. See Table 5 for more explanation.
